• Economic Analysis Seminar, Álvaro Name-Correa (Carlos III)

  • Start: Wednesday, 20 October 13:00
    End: Wednesday, 20 October 14:30
  • UCM Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Campus de Somosaguas, Pozuelo de Alarcón, España
  • Dept. Economic Analysis

    Research Seminars

    Dear all,
    The following IN PERSON SEMINAR  will take place next week. Remember that we do not have many seats available at the ICAE seminar room, so please, so come soon. Anyways, the seminar will be broadcasted through the usual Google Meets link

    Department of Economic Analysis & ICAE Research Seminars:

    WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20th, 2021, 13:00 h. @ ICAE Seminar Room (N101- Prefabricado)

    Álvaro Name Correa (Carlos III)

    TITLE: Multiple Prizes in Tournaments with Career Concerns (joint with Huseyin Yildirim, Duke)


    In a first period a designer selects the prize structure of a rank-order tournament in a setting where risk-neutral agents decide whether to participate or not. The score of a participant agent is determined by the sum of his (natural) talent, effort, and the noise term. Players besides caring about winning a prize, also have career concerns, and, as it is common in that literature, they do not know their talents. The market, however, learns about them through their performances. In a second period agents enter the (labor or talent) market regardless of their participation in the tournament. The market then makes each agent a wage offer equal to his inferred talent.

    We show that when agents are more patient or the variance of the error term is low, the tournament offered by the designer becomes less competitive (with more prizes) in order to induce participation. In the first case, career incentives are strong, in the second case, both career and tournament incentives are intense. Thus, given the market's expectation to perform, agents would be reluctant to enter the tournament, requiring the designer to announce a high number of (small) prizes. Furthermore, the optimal number of prizes is single peaked in the population variance of talent. This is because the most motivated agents in the tournament would be those who are moderately well-known by the market. Thus, given the market's expectation such agents would also be the most reluctant to enter in a competitive tournament.

    We also examine an alternative setting where only rankings are observed, and show that the designer offers a steeper prize schedule with fewer prizes with respect to the benchmark. This is due to career marginal incentives being less powerful in that case.

    You can join the  seminar through Google Hangout Meets at the following link:

    @ucm accounts are granted immediate access to the webinar. External accounts require explicit approval by the moderators.

    You can find the recording of the talk  as well as previous sessions, papers, and the schedule of upcoming seminars at the seminar’s webpage

    Hope to see you all there.
    Jimenez-Martin, Juan-Ángel 
    Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo 
    Rodríguez Hernández, Juan Gabriel
    Sartarelli, Marcello